Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
The main implications of the paper are developed in a basic example with two variations in Section III. In the key example, demand for the commodity is non-stochastic and unit elastic, storage is costless, and growers face perfectly correlated output shocks. Consider a vertically integrated case in which growers are able to store. Since identical growers will sell the same quantity to consumers, their revenues will be non-random from year to year. This eliminates the incentive to hedge, and so leads to a zero bias. If instead there is a separate group of storage firms, then this non-random revenue is divided into risky revenue distributions for storers and for growers which are perfectly negatively correlated (since when combined the joint activities are riskless). A futures market allows storers to shift their risk back to growers entirely, thereby cancelling growers' risks; and both groups will desire to make this trade at a futures price that is unbiased.
The conclusion of zero bias when demand is unitary elastic is consistent with single-period models of hedging and futures pricing without storage,7 but not with the hybrid models or the normal backwardation theories of Keynes, Hicks and Cootner.8 The source of the differing predictions of the hybrid models is the incentive to hedge against stochastic redistribution of wealth between generations.9
Two variations on the basic example introduce costs of storage and supply response. Variation I explores the incentive to hedge against future storage costs, the amount depending on the stochastic quantity to be stored in the future. Such a risk can only be contemplated in a multi-period model, in which agents who hedge today foresee a later storage decision to be made when the futures contract expires. In Variation 2, growers select planting levels each year, which leads to incentives to hedge against future planting costs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the economic setting. The futures/storage/lending decision problem is laid out in Section II. Then, market equilibrium in the basic example and the two variations discussed above are analysed in Section III. Section IV concludes the paper.
I. THE ECONOMIC SETTING
Let there be G identical growers, H identical storage firms (or 'handlers'), and S outside 'speculators'. All traders are risk-averse and agree on the distributions of all variables. Stochastic outputs are assumed to be perfectly correlated amongst growers. For most of the paper, the level of planting is not a decision variable (until Variation 2 in Section III). Growers produce a stochastic output of the commodity, and face a known demand curve. All traders are risk-I989] ANALYSIS 
OF FUTURES TRADING 703
averse and have time-additive utility. Growers and storers are able to borrow or lend at a risk-free rate of return, to buy, store and sell the commodity, and to trade futures."1 Growers and storers cannot issue equity, and so may wish to hedge against variable net revenues on the futures market."1 Speculators are non-commercial participants in the futures market, and cannot buy the spot commodity. Both the futures and spot markets are assumed to be competitive. Notationally, a superscript of 'g', 'h', or 's' will refer to quantities specific to an individual trader (grower, storer, or speculator); the absence of a superscript indicates any of these types of individuals. In decision problems where the individual takes the behaviour of others as given, an uppercase G, H, or S superscript will refer to specific quantities associated with any other individual grower, storer, or speculator. At date o the initial output level Q' is known, information set 00 is common knowledge, based on which producers select optimal storage levels, incur storage costs based on this choice, the remaining output is sold to consumers at spot price PO, and producers and speculators take positions 60 in a futures market with single-period contracts12 at futures pricefo. Furthermore, traders select their level of lending Lo at the risk-free rate for a single-period. Next year the stored commodity arrives (net of spoilage), along with new information 01, and a new crop with output Q'(01) per grower is realised. In equilibrium, the new information determines a new spot price P1 and futures price f1 on a contract to be settled at date 2. The spot price realisation at date i determines the profit or loss on the futures positions taken at date o, 60(Pl-fo). Again, levels of storage are selected, costs of new storage are incurred, and that portion of the commodity available (either from current output or from past storage) that is not stored is sold to consumers. Lending from the previous date is repaid, and new lending is selected. This sequence is continued through date T, the final consumption date for all traders. Thus, = output by any trader at date t; Qg = QtG since all growers are identical; and Q' = o since storers are endowed with none of the commodity. St = stocks purchased by the trader at t for resale at t+ I. y,(St), y', yt' > o is the storage cost as a deterministic function of the quantity stored, where the trader purchases the good at date t and holds it until t+ i.
('t = a constant waste or spoilage coefficient for storage, o < wt < i; of every unit stored at t, Oth arrives usably at t+ i. Pt = spot price for the commodity at date t.
Dt ( " Moral hazard and adverse selection problems make equity issuance a costly means of diversifying risk.
Most US grain output is grown by closely held farms, and much storage is by small grain elevators. Furthermore, even in widely held firms, optimal contracts that impose risk on managers may provide an incentive to hedge the firm's risk using futures. 12 Most commodity futures contracts are liquid up to less than a year to expiration. 13 This is the only way in which consumers enter the model; they do not store. I also assume that consumers do not hedge on the futures market against variable prices of consumption goods made from the commodity. This implicitly reflects fixed setup costs (possibly informational) of participating on the futures t= a one-period futures price quoted at date t. t= bushels of future (date-t + i) wheat purchased on the futures market at t.
Lt= amount lent at date t for a single period; it can be positive or negative. r = I + the real risk-free rate of return, assumed constant. Ct = consumption of a trader at date t. YO = initial wealth; for growers, YO is taken to include initial sales revenues POQo.
It is convenient to define 1t, t = I, ..., T to be wealth at t due to decisions made at t-i, where tildes indicate uncertainty about date-t variables as of t-I,I
Yt -( Qt + c )t-l St-0 Pt + (Pt -ft-l) 6t-l + rLt_l =I ***, T ( 
The top equality shows that consumption at date o is initial wealth less (i) the cost of setting SO of the crop aside to store, (ii) storage costs yo, and (iii) lending Lo, In the second equality, the first term indicates net receipts from sales of the commodity (to consumers or to other producers). The quantity the producer sells (negative if he buys to store) is the sum of his output and stocks carried in from date tless the quantity he carries over into the next crop year. The second term deducts storage costs (e.g. labour and equipment costs of holding the commodity), and the third term is the profit from the futures position taken at t-i. The last two terms are cashflows from past and current lending.
An element of the producer's decision problem not yet mentioned is the 'convenience yield' of holding the commodity. Brennan (I986) analyses the convenience yield, viewed as a benefit derived from having the commodity available for productive use in the event of a local shortage. The traditional assumption that the marginal convenience yield decreases with the inventory of the commodity can prevent stockouts (corner solutions with zero carryover). A nonlinear cost of storage function is explicitly considered in Variation I on the basic model in Section III; to accommodate a convenience yield, the function would be shifted downward so that at low levels of stocks, the cost of storage would be negative.14 Each of the variables in (i) and (2) 
15 An alternative approach to the pricing of futures, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), assumes that equity shares can be traded on all endowments (i.e. on both producers' revenues and on Nt here). Stoll (I979) and Berck and Cecchetti (1985) examine equilibrium pricing of futures contracts in models where, instead of issuing equity, producers hedge their revenues on the futures market, while speculators trade other risky endowments on the equity market. The effects described here would also operate in a setting with many risky securities. 16 It is assumed that preferences are such that the positive-consumption constraint is never binding. Condition ( This shows that the futures position at T-2 is guided by how the spot price at T-I covaries with news at T-affecting the later date-T marginal utility. More generally, the first order conditions at date t reflect the multiperiod tradeoffs involving the stochastically variable levels of consumption at all later dates.
18 It may be deduced by comparing the payoffs to the alternative methods for obtaining a future bushel of wheat of storage versus a long futures position. 19 For example, support that at T-a large crop (and low PT-1) leads to a larger downward bias in futures pricefT-1. A downward bias at T-leads to a long speculative position; a larger bias makes the speculator better off by giving him a greater opportunity to profit from his long position. So the speculator is better off at T-i when PT-1 is low, and worse off when PT-1 is high. To hedge this risk, or more precisely, to exploit the stochastic variation in his marginal utility of date T-wealth, he will in general take a nonzero futures position at T-2.
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III. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
The heart of this paper consists of a basic example of market equilibrium and two variations that show how various economic factors (vertical integration of spot markets, spoilage and dollar storage costs, supply response of growers) affect hedging and the risk premium on futures contracts. Also, the stockhedging risk premium theory of Cootner and more recent writers, and the single-period lifetime model of carryover that is uniform in the futures literature are shown to be seriously incomplete; a very different set of predictions arises in a multi-period equilibrium setting. In the absence of carryover, random demand variability generally promotes short hedging by producers and downward bias in the futures price (Stiglitz, I983). Several authors (cited in the introduction) have examined output variability and futures market equilibrium in two-date models. A conclusion of this literature is that the futures price bias depends on elasticity of demand, being toward downward bias in the usual case in which demand is inelastic, and upward bias if demand is elastic.20 Therefore, to focus on the pure effect of storage and the level of inventories on hedging and price bias, a convenient benchmark case is where producers face stochastic output but non-stochastic demand, and where demand elasticity is unitary, since in the absence of carryover this case leads to zero bias. These assumptions, though special, are maintained in all the scenarios.2" The scenarios explored yield results not previously obtained in the single-period literature; for this purpose working with special assumptions that could hold in reality is sufficient.
Before turning to the main analysis, the effect of varying two assumptions should be mentioned. First, if demand instead of output were stochastic, and if demand were stochastically independent over time, then I conjecture that downward bias would result, as occurs in single-period models. In such a case high demand would be good news for both growers and for storers, leading to an incentive to hedge short.22 Second, the effect of allowing consumers to hedge would depend on demand elasticity, and on complementarity of preferences in consumption between different commodities (D. Hirshleifer, i988c).23 20 See, e.g. Anderson and Danthine (I983) and Britto (I984). The reason is that demand elasticity determines whether high output is good or bad news for producers' revenues. With inelastic demand, high output reduces the spot price disproportionately, reducing revenue. This creates a short-hedging incentive, and so downward bias. With elastic demand, the spot price falls less, so that revenue is high when output is high. This causes long hedging, and so upward bias. 21 D. Hirshleifer (i988 a) provided a third variation, which extended the two-date result relating demand elasticity to bias to a three-date setting with carryover. 22 The simplifying assumption of additive logarithmic utility may be needed to limit hedging against intertemporal shifts in futures trading opportunities.
23 Consider a single-period setting with full participation by consumers, and two complementary consumption goods. Assume that one good is in stochastic aggregate supply, and may be purchased at a prespecified price by taking a long futures position, and that the other is a numeraire commodity that is in nonstochastic supply. A high output of the stochastic commodity raises consumption, which raises the marginal utility of consuming more of the numeraire. Since this occurs when the spot price of the risky commodity is low, a positive risk premium on the futures contract is needed to compensate for the undesirable characteristic of paying off poorly when marginal utility is high. With G identical producers, and suppressing G superscripts, spot market clearing requires that demand at date t equal supply, Naturally, in more complex scenarios there is no reason to expect perfect cancellation to take place. However, the example demonstrates that looking only at inventory hedging in determining the bias is capricious; the need to hedge random outputs may be equally important, and may act in an opposing direction. 24 When storage costs are precisely linear (or zero), the payoffs from storage can be duplicated by lending and futures trading, implying the existence of an infinity of optimal policies that produce equivalent patterns of consumption. A convenient solving device is to assume that all members of an identical group of producers take the same actions; then the aggregate market-clearing condition pins down individual positions. It is best to view zero storage costs as a limiting case as identical storage costs approach zero, so that optimal positions are unique.
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If demand rather than output were stochastic, then downward bias would typically occur, consistent with the prediction of normal backwardation theory in its simplest form. However, it is important to recognise that stochastic demand leads to downward bias even without storage, so there is no implication that storage is a cause of downward bias.
Part B. Specialised Growers and Storers
Cootner ( Consistent with normal backwardation theory, storage firms are short fully here. Nevertheless, storage promotes neither upward nor downward bias. Thus, the analysis lends no support to the presumption that the expected trend in the futures price is largest when stocks are high. This is initially surprising in view of the downward pressure that short hedging should exert on the futures price. However, short-hedging by storers is offset by a long-hedging incentive of growers. This may be viewed in two ways. First, since the aggregate revenue each period is non-stochastic, growers' revenues must be perfectly negatively correlated with storers. So if a short hedge eliminates the storers' risks, a long hedge eliminates the risks of growers.
Second, and perhaps more informatively, the price risk borne by growers is reduced by the actions of storers, because storage acts as a buffer to reduce the price response to quantity shocks. Without storage, a high output is precisely offset by a low price, making revenue constant. With storage, a high output is only partly offset by a lesser fall in price, so growers do well when the price 'is low. Therefore a long futures position, which profits when the spot price is high, reduces growers' risks.
Futures Trading as a Substitute for Vertical Integration
In an industry with closely held producers, the basic example shows that vertical integration is a possible organisational response to risk. Vertically integrated producers are perfectly self-hedged by the offset between the quantity they sell to consumers and the spot price. Segregated producers, on the other hand, would (without a futures market) be forced to bear perfectly negatively correlated risks, because of the stochastic division of revenues between growers and storers.
However, instead of combining the productive activities under joint ownership, Part B demonstrates that producers can remain segregated and still perfectly diversify their negatively correlated risks in the futures market. The intuition underlying these results is disjoint from that of the normal backwardation theory, in which short hedging of stocks leads to a bias. We saw in the basic example that short hedging of stocks in the current setting did not promote a bias. Here, the force promoting bias is hedging against the stochastic storage costs to be incurred in the future. The magnitude of the bias will be related to the amount of output uncertainty being resolved over the life of the futures contract.
The basic argument is that since storage is costly, even with unitary demand elasticity producers cannot eliminate all risk. It remains true that in equilibrium with producers storing identically, gross revenues are non-stochastic. However, by promoting storage a high output raises the total storage costs incurred at date i, so a high Q1 is bad news for producers. So at the optimum, the marginal indirect utility of date I wealth rises with Q1. Therefore, the marginal utility of wealth is inversely ordered with the payoff provided by a long futures position, 60(f1 -fo). This creates an incentive at date o for producers to hedge short, 29 In a multiperiod setting, matters are complicated by two types of second order effects. First are nuisance wealth effects on the degree of risk aversion, which result each time information arrives to redistribute wealth between speculators and hedgers. The second, which are influenced by the first, are due to the incentive for speculators to hedge against shifts in the investment opportunity set, i.e. shifts in bias. Results on bias with speculators in the market could be derived by assuming specific forms (such as quadratic) for the utility and cost functions. 30 Allowing high output today to be associated with good news about next year's crop could lead to cases in which higher output inhibits storage. This would alter the returns that follow, but is probably an uncommon case. 
Hedging by Storers
A venerable and widely accepted prescription for storage firms hedging in an unbiased futures market without basis risk is to take a full short position, i.e. sell short the entire inventory.32 In a multi-period setting, full short hedging in general fails to minimise risk. Furthermore, a short position may be riskincreasing, so that a long hedge is called for. The storers' sole source of risk in the conventional analysis is the resale value of stocks. A high aggregate output/low spot price would be bad news for a storer concerned only with the value of his stocks at date i. This risk can be eliminated with a full short position. However, a storer at date o foresees a second period, and knows that a good crop, by reducing P1, will raise the profitability of storage at date i. Hence, his rents derived from the ability in the future to store are negatively correlated with the value of his current stocks. Indeed, if the crop at date o is small, so that he currently stores little, then it is future rents, not the value of current stocks that are the primary concern. In this event, the second effect predominates, so the optimal hedge is long. 
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are removed from the futures market. Suppose a futures position is taken at date o, and that at date i information arrives which determines the optimal level of planting at date i for later harvest at date . For simplicity, the only information arriving at date i is the output realisation Q1; this affects the incentive to plant at date I through its effect on storage S1.34 A high Q1 reduces the benefit to planting, by raising carryover and so lowering P2. It follows that although it will be assumed that weather conditions are independent over time, i.e. Otis independent of ?)t-1 now output will in equilibrium be autocorrelated. To endogenise supply, let xt be the acreage planted at date t and V ( where xi = g(Q1). The first RHS term in (I 7) reflects the price/quantity offset of (i i). Since no planting occurs at final date 2, the constraint for date 2 iS precisely (2) applied at t = T= 2, and involves no revenue risk. In this scenario, at date o producers will hedge against planting costs to be incurred at date i, leading to upward bias (contango). Rather, it arises from hedging against fluctuations in total storage costs to be incurred, the variation in storage arising from stochastic output. Furthermore, with costly storage, storers with low inventories may wish to hedge long, contrary to conventional accounts. Second, when supply is flexible, hedging against future planting costs promotes upward bias (contango).
The examples of equilibrium provided in Section III demonstrated that multi-period analysis of the division of risk leads to implications that are dramatically different from previous models. However, they were developed under a number of very special assumptions. A fruitful avenue for future research may be to explore equilibrium storage, commodity pricing and welfare applying the more general multi-period decision framework for the analysis of storage, futures trading and lending provided here.
Empirically, the analysis suggests that high levels of inventories may not predict positive futures price changes, as maintained by Cootner (I960) and more recent writers. Rather, high inventories could be associated with either upward, downward or zero futures price bias. Proof of Proposition 4. We will first put bounds on S'. We now view optimal date-I policies to be functions L1(Ql) and S1(Ql) of the date-I state of the world Q . For brevity, primes will denote parametric derivatives of policy functions, assumed differentiable, and of prices with respect to Q1. Substituting for consumption from (2) into (8) 
